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BRINGING AGE DISCRIMINATION AND
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION TOGETHER:
TOO FEW INTERSECTIONS, TOO MANY
INTERSTICES
Leslie Pickering Francis* and Anita Silvers-
Are harmful biases against different biological conditions of
people, for example, skin color, sex, senescence, or disabling
impairment fundamentally similar, so that legal prohibitions of,
or protections against, their wrongful influences should be the
same? U.S. jurisprudence has tended to answer "no" and,
therefore, to treat each kind of discrimination as being wrong in
its own way. As illustrated by one of the examples that we
discuss below, groups seeking constitutional protection from
inequality have found courts disinclined to weigh as alike the
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Francis and Silvers, coeds.; Blackwell 2004), and Americans with Disabilities:
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harm that unequal treatment, such as state-imposed segregated
housing, does to different kinds of people.'
To be sure, especially over the past quarter century, the
tendency to see different kinds of groups' vulnerability to
discrimination as disparate has receded somewhat, especially
when the categories of race and sex are compared. But theories
about and assessments of discrimination against some other
groups distance them from one another, despite initial
resemblances. Old age and disability, for instance, would seem
to have some adverse features in common. Membership in
either group suggests depleted capability, decreased social
contribution, significant fragility, and heightened susceptibility
to maltreatment by other people.
Given these congruencies between their targets, age
discrimination and disability discrimination might seem to call
for corresponding theoretical responses and comparable
practical attention as well. Yet some have argued that no wrong
occurs when advanced age-that is, aged-ness2-iS made
disadvantageous, for the elderly have had a fair chance at the
goods of life. By contrast, this argument goes, there is never a
fair chance for people with disabilities, and members of some
other socially disadvantaged groups, such as the impoverished,
are also likely never to have had one. So while denying
resources in short supply to people based on their disability or
their poverty would be unfair, old people may be told that they
have had a fair chance at the goods of life and now must accept
reduced rations, just because they are old.
In this article, we challenge the view that takes
discrimination based on disability and discrimination based on
aged-ness as so discrepant that they do not deserve similar
1. See infra, notes 2 to 105 and accompanying text.
2. We should note that there is a difference between discrimination based on
age, and discrimination based on aged-ness. The former merely references age (and
could prohibit discrimination at any age), while the latter specifically refers to
discrimination based on advancing age. The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act elides the difference, limiting protection to those over the age of forty, but
prohibiting discrimination based on age after that point. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2009).
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efforts for justice. Against this fragmented approach that treats
sufferers from discrimination disparately, depending on the
types of people they are, we argue instead for an inclusive
justice that affords "meaningful access" to all. To do so, we
examine various accounts of the obligation of the state to liberate
people from the disadvantageous effects of biases against
groups to which they belong.
The problem we propose to correct here suggests that bias
based on advanced age and bias based on disability should be
valued not merely differently but antithetically. Not least of the
potentially pernicious consequences of this problem is pitting
the interests of elderly individuals against the interests of
individuals of all ages who have disabilities. As some people
belong to both these groups, their intersectionality draws them,
on the view we shall oppose, into being in conflict with
themselves.
Our illustrations are taken from housing policy, fees for
access to public services and events, and health care. In each
case, we argue that the standard of "meaningful access" has
been poorly understood, if applied at all. These are important
examples, but they are by no means the only illustrations of the
problem. To mention one other, in the fall of 2009 the United
States Congress passed federal hate crimes legislation, finding
that "[t]he incidence of violence motivated by the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, gender identity, or disability of the victim poses a
serious national problem."3 Notably absent from these protected
categories is aged-ness, despite extensive documentation of
widespread abuse and violence against the elderly.4
3. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, H.R.
2647, Pub. L. No. No: 111-84, Division E, § 4702(1) (2009).
4. See, e.g., U.S. Administration on Aging, National Center on Elder Abuse,
Fact Sheet, http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/ncearoot/MainSite/pdf/publication/Final
Statistics050331.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) (estimating that 1-2 million adults
over age sixty-five are abused each year and quoting prevalence rates of 2-10%).
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AGED-NESS AND DISABILITY: ERRORS IN THEORY OF JUSTICE
We begin with some brief remarks about two missteps in justice
theory that have helped support the mistaken belief in the
incongruousness of advanced age and disability. Despite their
disagreements on other matters, theories of justice advanced by
egalitarians and utilitarians have seemed to concur in
supporting the conclusion that age rationing can be justified.
From the egalitarian side, some have argued that the elderly
should take a back seat, because they have had more of the good
of life.' Richard Lamm,6 the former Governor of Colorado, and
Daniel Callahan,7 from the Hastings Center, are examples. From
the utilitarian side, others have argued that welfare
maximization counts against the elderly: we will "get more for
our money" in health care if we employ measures such as
quality adjusted life years (QALYs) in assessing cost-
effectiveness of care.8 Such measures do not bode well for the
elderly, who presumably have fewer years of life left than the
young.
Disadvantageous treatment on the basis of disability,
however, has seemed to be another matter, for here utilitarian
and egalitarian justice theories are not drawn together in
agreement. Welfare-maximizing utilitarians appear
unabashedly to think of disability as relevant in regard to the
5. See, e.g., RICHARD LAMM, THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF HEALTH CARE
(Fulcrum Publishing 2003); DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN
AN AGING SOCIETY (Simon & Schuster 1987); NORMAN DANIELS, AM I MY PARENTS'
KEEPER? (Oxford Univ. Press 1988); Margaret P. Battin, Age Rationing and the Just
Distribution of Health Care: Is There a Duty to Die?, 97 ETHICS 317 (1987); J. Grimley
Evans, The Rationing Debate: Rationing Health Care by Age: The Case Against, 314 BRIT.
MED. J. 822 (1997) (characterizing the debate as the "fair innings" issue); The New
Old Age Blog, http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/rationing-health-
care-part-2/, for a discussion of these debates in the context of contemporary health
care reform (last visited Sept. 2, 2009).
6. See LAMM, supra note 5; see also Anita Silvers, Damaged Goods: Does Disability
DisQALYfy People from Just Health Care?, 62(2) MT. SINAI J. MED 102 (1995).
7. See Callahan, supra note 5.
8. See, e.g., Sudhir Anand & Kara Hanson, Disability-Adjusted Life Years: A
Critical Review, 16 J. HEALTH ECON. 685 (1997); John Harris, QALYfying the Value of
Life, 13 J. MED. ETHICS 117 (1987).
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justice of distributions, for they assume that people with
disabilities will wring less benefit out of a particular resource
than the nondisabled. If directing resources to people with
disabilities produces less overall good than alternatives, so be it,
from the point of view of utilitarian justice.
The utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer's position on the
effect of disability on the value of people's lives has become
emblematic of this theory, although more nuanced and less
dogmatic utilitarianisms are not too hard to find. Singer's
earliest venture on to this platform was his proposal that
newborns with serious disabilities be allowed to die, and he
continues to maintain this view, even though over the years he
has elevated the seriousness a disability must exhibit to warrant
such disregard. 9 Much more recently, Singer has argued on
welfare maximizing grounds that having quadriplegia
disqualifies individuals from priority for health care resources. 0
The debate between Singer and disability advocate Harriet
McBryde Johnson about disability bias also is well known."
Many egalitarians, by comparison, would object: welfarist
prioritarians, for example, might hold that people with
disabilities are among the worst off who have primary claims on
resources, even if those resources would produce less welfare
for them than for others higher up the scale of well-being.12
Although these matters are so complex that we cannot fully
address them here, it is important for our later argument to note
two related mistakes in presumptions prompting the several
positions we have just described. These errors-really two sides
9. See HELGE KUHSE & PETER SINGER, SHOULD THE BABY LIVE?: THE PROBLEM
OF HANDICAPPED INFANTS (Oxford Univ. Press 1985).
10. Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 19,
2009, at 42-43.
11. See, e.g., Peter Singer, Happy Nevertheless, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 28, 2008, at
34; Harriet McBryde Johnson, The Disability Gulag, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 23, 2003,
at 58; Harriet McBryde Johnson, Unspeakable Conversations, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 6,
2003 at 50. For another example of a clear statement that disability is correlated with
reduced welfare see Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay for Bad Genes?, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1345, 1346 (2002).
12. See Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, in IDEALS OF EQUALITY 1 (Andrew
Mason ed., Blackwell 1998).
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of the same coin of viewing justice in a certain quantified way -
can be found in writings attributed to both the egalitarian and
utilitarian camps. One has to do with a misunderstanding about
the substance of equality. The other arises from a
misunderstanding about the substance of quality of life.
The first mistake is committed by theorists who link
equality to the comparative quanta of the goods of life that
individuals have had. On this account, elders are likely to be
deemed already to have enjoyed more equality than youngsters,
just because older people have had a longer span during which
to acquire and enjoy various goods. Egalitarians who think this
way transmute equality into a quantum of something, often
welfare or the like. They adopt a distributive rather than a
procedural understanding of equality, so they do not base
equality on receiving equal respect as a person, but base equality
on receiving the same amount of what is good, whether welfare
or some other good." This mistake obviously skews how
disadvantageous treatment of the elderly will be weighed.
Of note, it may also skew weighing of disadvantageous
treatment of the disabled by any theorist who supposes that the
disabled enjoy special benefits and care. On this mistake, the
disabled would be regarded as having received their fair
quantum of the goods of life, just perhaps using them up more
quickly. An analogy would be to lifetime caps on health
insurance payments, with the elderly having consumed their
share over their lifespan, and the disabled having spent theirs
more quickly because of presumed "special" needs.
The second mistake is committed by those who regard the
overall quantum of welfare produced by a distributive scheme
as important in judgments of justice. For these non-prioritarian
welfarists, the amount of good produced overall matters, even if
those who benefit are higher on a scale of welfare than some
who do not. This view is illustrated in Peter Singer's claims in
13. For a criticism of such equality "of what" views, and a defense of the point
of equality as ending oppression, see Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of
Equality, 109 ETHIcS 287 (1999).
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his debates with Harriet McBryde Johnson and also is found in
Singer's other discussions of disability. This is the idea that
when people suffer severe and irreversible deficits of normal
levels of physical or mental functioning, the quality of their lives
also is so deficient as to undermine their potential for
happiness. 14 Thus distributions of goods to them will produce
less in overall benefit than distributions of goods to others. In
later reflection on his exchange of views with Johnson, Singer
seems to admit that his judgments about her life had misfired,
but without conceding her fundamental point that
misjudgments about the risks that people with disabilities face
daily because of non-prioritarian welfarist assumptions about
what management would be good for them 5 are pervasive
among utilitarians.16
These mistakes, moreover, can be linked to problematic
policy positions on age and disability. For example, the idea
that the touchstone for equality is a quantum of welfare, and
that those who are worse off have priority on resources to reach
that level of welfare, feeds the idea that egalitarianism must
confront "bottomless pits" or "black holes" of demands on
resources.17  This idea has led some to shy away from casting
access to health care, for example, in terms of rights.'8
14. For a fuller discussion of these biases as they have played into
misunderstandings of what non-discrimination requires with respect to the
treatment of newborns, see Anita Silvers & Leslie P. Francis, Playing God with Baby
Doe: Quality of Life and Unpredictable Life Standards at the Start of Life, GA. ST. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009). For a discussion of logical flaws in quality of life scales,
especially as these relate to measuring the quality of disabled people's lives, see
Anita Silvers, Predicting Genetic Disability While Commodifying Health, in QUALITY OF
LIFE AND HUMAN DIFFERENCE 43 (Jerome Bickenbach et al. eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2005).
15. Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit call such interactive risks "corrosive"
disadvantages. JONATHAN WOLFF & AVNER DE-SHALIT, DISADVANTAGE 133, ch. 8
(Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
16. See Singer, supra note 11, at 34 (even the title of the tribute, Happy
Nevertheless, reveals bias in Singer's assumptions about disability as an insuperable
source of suffering).
17. For a discussion of the maxim, see generally PETER SINGER, ANIMAL
LIBERATION: A NEw ETHIC FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS (New York: Random
House 1975).
18. See Allen Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care, 13 PHIL.
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Inescapable imprecisions-both inflationary and deprecating-
in judging the retrospective welfare of the elderly and the
prospective welfare of the disabled risks both underestimations
and overestimations.
For the elderly, these may be overestimations of the benefits
they have received in the past and underestimations of the
benefits to come. For the disabled, these may be
underestimations of the benefits they can realize and
overestimations of the demands they might place on resources.
Thus the mistakes we have identified can deepen resistance to
policy efforts to address both disability bias and bias against the
aged.
There is, however, a fundamental difference between
utilitarians and egalitarians of almost any stripe that does matter
to our argument. The difference can be put in terms of how the
famous maxim, "each to count for one and none for more than
one" is to be read. For pure utilitarians, as John Rawls pointed
out, each person counts for one only by being figured into an
overall calculus of maximization of the good.19 For it is the
magnitude of the overall good achieved, not the amount of good
each person individually may enjoy that counts first for
utilitarians.2 0 Egalitarians, on the other hand, see justice as
concerned with how each individual fares, rather than as simply
a matter of the overall good to be achieved.' Each person
matters in some way as a locus of good, as an individual being
whose good life must be considered apart from the overall good.
Elsewhere we have considered justice envisioned equitably,
that is, in terms of achieving meaningful access to important
social goods for each.22 In this article, we continue to draw
PUB. AFF. 55, 63 (1984).
19. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press 1971).
20. See id. at 161-75.
21. See, e.g., Richard Arneson, Egalitarianism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism/ (last visited Nov. 8,
2009).
22. See Leslie P. Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alexander v. Choate:
"Meaningful Access" to Health Care for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
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attention to how the failure to see justice in this way is
problematic. Here we will show how neglecting the justice of
meaningful access has impeded understanding of how effective
protection against both age discrimination and disability
discrimination can be made congruent. We also shall show that,
when this omission is exacerbated by the two mistakes we
identified earlier in this section, efforts to safeguard people from
disadvantage based on these two kinds of biases may be viewed
as if they are in conflict with one another.
AGE AND DISABILITY AS PROTECTED CATEGORIES
Beyond the ease with which their acronyms are confused, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 23 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)24 might seem to have
much in common, as do the vulnerabilities of age and disability.
Age and disability were the two categories added to federal
prohibitions on employment discrimination after the initial
adoption of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.2 These prohibitions
were thought to be needed because both the elderly and the
disabled had experienced arbitrary barriers to employment and
suffered economic disadvantage as a result. But neither the
elderly nor the disabled have been viewed in law as a "discrete
and insular" minority26 of the kind singled out for special
101 (2008).
23. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2009) (ADEA).
24. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009) (ADA).
25. Pub. L. 82-352, 78 Stat. 241, Title VII (1964).
26. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (explaining that
the elderly are not a discrete and insular minority); Americans with Disabilities
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, § 3(2) (amending the ADA of 1990 to
remove the following text:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have
been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the
control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate
in, and contribute to, society.)
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constitutional scrutiny since Justice Stone's famous footnote.27
These are categories, we are reminded, into which we all might
fall someday, albeit that such reminders incorporate an ironic
twist about the desirability of entering into either category.
Thus neither old age nor disability delineates minorities in
precisely the classic constitutional sense.
Despite, or perhaps because of, their ubiquity, old age and
disability are categories about which the law has remained
somewhat ambivalent. After the United States Supreme Court
held that Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment did not extend to abrogating state sovereign
immunity from suits for discrimination in employment based on
age, 28 an extension of this reasoning to discrimination based on
disability soon followed.29 In these decisions, the disabled and
the elderly were set apart from those claiming discrimination
based on race or sex.30
Addressing racial discrimination was, of course, at the very
core of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court has continued
to hold that discrimination based on sex has a kind of malignant
history that, in the judgment of the Court, differentiation based
on disability or age does not.31 Instead, the Court has opined,
the state may have very good reasons for differentiation based
on age or disability: "Age classifications, unlike governmental
conduct based on race or gender, cannot be characterized as 'so
seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed
27. U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
28. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 (holding that section 5 does not give Congress the
power to reinterpret Fourteenth Amendment rights; such interpretive powers
belong to the courts. Instead, Congress's section 5 power is the power to adopt
enforcement mechanisms that are "congruent and proportional" to the Fourteenth
Amendment rights violations to be condemned).
29. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370 (2001).
30. See, e.g., id.; Kimel, 528 U.S. 62.
31. See Nev. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that Congress had intended
to authorize suits against states under the Family Medical Leave Act and that this
was a proper use of Congress's enforcement powers under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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to reflect prejudice and antipathy."'3 2  Instead, specially
protective legislation may be in order for these groups, from
property tax relief for the elderly to exemptions from ordinary
responsibility for the disabled. Thus age and disability, in the
judgment of the Court, may both matter and not matter in how
society decides to treat people differently. Behind this
ambivalence lurks a deeper tension between the goals of, on the
one hand, eliminating depreciative generalized descriptions of
the disabled and the elderly because such stereotyping of them
as "defective" engenders their arbitrary social exclusion, and on
the other hand, of stimulating special benefits for them, induced
by generalized descriptions that emphasize their deficits.
Here, the apparent similarities between old age and
disability may seem to end, however. Two well-known
discrepancies are illustrative. Discrimination against people
with disabilities in the sense of exclusion from beneficial social
participation has been longstanding, 33 in the current opinion of
the Court, which denies a similar history of pervasive
discrimination against their group to the elderly.34 Thus the
Americans with Disabilities Act extended protection against
exclusion beyond employment to public services, public
accommodations, transportation, communications devices, and
the like.35 The Fair Housing Act protects people with disabilities
against discrimination, but does not extend this same protection
to the elderly.3 6 Notably, the federal protection against housing
discrimination based on familial status exempts the privileged
32. Kirnel, 528 U.S. at 83 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432
(1985)).
33. Both the ADA of 1990 and the ADA Amendments Act are intended to
"provide a comprehensive national mandate" for the "elimination of discrimination
against people with disabilities." Pub. L. 110-325 § 2(a)(1) (2008).
34. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83. In his dissent in Cleburne, however, Justice Marshall
excoriated the majority for their assumptions that the history of treatment of people
with disabilities had been benign, and their concomitant announcement that people
with disabilities were not a quasi-suspect class and thus disability discrimination
should be tested against a rational basis standard. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461-63
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
35. ADA, supra note 24.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2009).
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forms of "senior living" communities that have sprung up across
the Sun Belt and elsewhere.37
In what follows, we consider these twin portrayals of old
age and disability, both as categories where discrimination is rife
and as categories where special protections might be in order. In
each case, we shall contend, there are double-binds between
what is required for genuine inclusiveness and what has been
pejoratively viewed as unjustified "special privilege." Both
advanced age and disability often inflect functioning in ways
that matter in regard to the ability to participate in and enjoy the
benefits of social life. Our aim is to understand what it is to have
meaningful access to important social goods when age,
disability, or both are mediating factors. The examples we
examine below reveal how the journey to opening up
meaningful access for both these groups has been deflected by
the logical mistakes we identified earlier, and suggest how a
reformed and reformulated theory of justice could put these
efforts back on the road.
FAIR HOUSING AND INDEPENDENT, INTEGRATED COMMUNITY
LIVING
The current federal Fair Housing Act (FHAct) protects all
citizens from discrimination in housing on the basis of race,
color, national origin, religion, sex, handicap, or familial status
(families with children under the age of eighteen living with
parents or legal guardians; pregnant women and people trying
to get custody of children under eighteen).38 In its original form,
enacted in 1968, the FHAct protected people from housing
practices that discriminated on the basis of race, color, religion,
or national origin.39 Its target was ghettoization, for example,
the role in maintaining segregation played by refusals to rent or
37. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2) (2009).
38. The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2009).
39. Sex was added as a category protected against discrimination in 1974.
Housing and Community Development Act, Ch. 42, sec. 1490g, § 527(b)(2), 88 Stat.
633, 729 (1947).
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sell to people of color.40  Decisions interpreting the statute
treated it as a civil rights statute in the sense of removing
barriers; early cases did not even extend it to practices that
operated to make it more difficult to achieve integration in
housing, such as "red-lining." 41 Only after Congress gave the
Department of Housing and Urban Development rule-making
authority to carry out the provisions of the FHAct42 was
redlining brought clearly under the ambit of prohibited
discriminatory practices.4 3
Discrimination based on disability and on familial status
was brought within the FHAct in 1988.44 At the same time, the
FHAct was amended to provide enforcement mechanisms that
have been judged to be significantly stronger than the
enforcement mechanisms available under the public
accommodations title of the Americans with Disabilities Act.45
The prohibition on disability discrimination sought to address
both physical inaccessibility and exclusionary practices that
made it difficult for people with disabilities, especially people
with mental disabilities, to find places to live in the
community.46 With these goals in mind, the 1988 amendments
required reasonable accommodations for people with
40. United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Housing and
Civil Enforcement Section, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/housing-coverage.
php (last visited Aug. 31, 2009); see John Hugh Gilmore, Insurance Redlining & The
Fair Housing Act: The Lost Opportunity of Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Companies,
34 CATH. U. L. REV. 563,565 (1985).
41. Redlining is the practice of giving less favorable credit terms based on the
characteristics of the neighborhood. Its existence was widespread in the mortgage
and homeowners' insurance markets. Id. at 578-79. The Fourth Circuit, however,
refused to permit a challenge to redlining in home insurance under the Fair
Housing Act. See Mackey v. Nationwide Ins., 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).
42. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3614a (2009).
43. See Fuller v. Tchrs. Ins., 2007 WL 2746861 (E.D. N.C. 2007) (distinguishing
Mackey).
44. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-619 (1988).
45. Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 377, 391 (2000).
46. Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One's Own: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988 and Housing Discrimination Against People with Mental Disabilities, 43 AM. U.L.
REV. 925, 949 (1994).
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disabilities. 4 7  For physical accessibility, the amendments
required that tenants be permitted to make reasonable
modifications, albeit at their own expense and, if the landlord
requested, with the requirement that the premises be returned in
their original condition.48  Importantly, high costs of
modifications continue to prove a significant barrier to people
with disabilities on limited incomes.49  New multifamily
premises over a specified number of units were required to be
constructed to meet a limited set of accessibility requirements,50
but failure to meet required construction standards remains a
continuing problem.5 1  No accessibility requirements apply to
privately owned dwellings, and much of the nation's single-
family housing stock remains inaccessible to people with
physical disabilities. 2 Notably, such inaccessibility for people
with physical disabilities is a significant obstacle for many of the
elderly who seek to age "in place," in their homes, with their
friends and families, and in their communities. 53
Reasonable accommodations for people with mental
disabilities have proved distressingly elusive under the FHAct.
Despite reminders from the Supreme Court that the purposes of
the FHAct are to be construed liberally,54 outright discrimination
against people with mental illness or substance abuse diagnoses
remains a problem, and reasonable accommodations are difficult
47. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, supra note 44.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A) (2009).
49. Christina Kubiak, Everyone Deserves a Decent Place to Live: Why the Disabled
are Systematically Denied Fair Housing Despite Federal Legislation, 5 RUTGERS J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 561, 570 (2008).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (2009).
51. See Laura Rothstein, Strategic Advocacy in Fulfilling the Goals of Disability
Policy: Is the Only Question How Full the Glass Is?, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 403, 406
(2008).
52. See Robin Paul Malloy, Accessible Housing and Mobility Impairment, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 699 (2009).
53. Jon Pynoos et al., Aging in Place, Housing, and the Law, 16 ELDER L.J. 77
(2008).
54. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731, 738 (1995)
(holding that a zoning restriction defining "family" for the purpose of restricting a
neighborhood to single family dwellings is not a maximum occupancy limit exempt
from FHAct regulation).
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to achieve for these populations.55 The accommodations needed
by people with mental disabilities may include help in dealing
with landlords or in responding to complaints about allegedly
aberrant behavior, yet many courts are reluctant to require
interactive processes between landlords and tenants of the kind
employers must follow when requests for accommodations are
made, even though such processes may ease conflict and
generate new solutions to problems.56 Ironically, and critically
to our point in this article, one of the leading cases rejecting an
interactive process to achieve accommodation involved a
request for a zoning variance for a bed care facility for the
elderly.57 Similar difficulties of exclusion dog efforts to enforce
the Olmstead mandate58 of placement in the most integrated
community setting as a requirement for public services under
the ADA.59
To date, age has not been among the categories listed for
protection against discrimination in housing, although to the
extent that seniors experience increased risks of disability, they
do receive the protections accorded people with disabilities, as
well any other protections that are applicable under the FHAct.60
Instead, the addition of familial status as a protected category in
the 1988 amendments to the FHAct extends a quite different
kind of protection for seniors: exemption from the prohibition of
discrimination based on familial status. This exemption applies
to senior housing, defined as housing which is occupied solely
55. Kubiak, supra note 49, at 570; see Kanter, supra note 46, at 949.
56. Gretchen M. Widmer, We Can Work It Out: Reasonable Accommodation and the
Interactive Process Under the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 2007 U. ILL. L. Rev. 761,
772 (2007).
57. Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 445-46 (3d
Cir. 2002).
58. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999).
59. See, e.g., Victoria Stirling, Case Note: M.A.C. v. Williams: Utah's Disabled
Citizens Challenge Frustrating Waiting Lists for Home and Community-Based Services, 9
J.L. FAM. STUD. 361, 361, 363 (2007); Meris Bergquist, No Exit for Patients Confined at
the Vermont State Hospital, 32 VT. B. J. 34 (2006) (compiling cases permitting
exclusionary practices against group homes).
60. Robert G. Schwemm & Michael Allen, For the Rest of Their Lives: Seniors and
the Fair Housing Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 121, 145, 177-78, 216 (2004).
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by persons who are sixty-two or older, or houses where at least
one person who is fifty-five or older resides in at least eighty
percent of the occupied units and adheres to a policy that
demonstrates intent to house persons who are fifty-five or
older.61 Attendants needed for the reasonable accommodation
of persons with disabilities are not included for purposes of
these calculations, 62 and adult disabled children of seniors may
be exempt as well.63 Seniors, in short, can discriminate against
the young, as long as their housing arrangements impose
sufficient age uniformity.
Allowed to impose these protective familial status
conditions, seniors with sufficient resources thus may gather in
insulated enclaves-apart from the rest of the world, if they so
wish. Some of these "adult" communities arguably foster
attitudes of resentment about contributing to the support of the
larger community's children or other community needs.64 In
some states, non-profit senior living communities attract
relatively well-off residents yet benefit from tax exemptions at
the expense of other community organizations.65 There are more
than fifty Sun City communities in twenty states.66 Policies that
protect these communities, as well as other protective policies
such as tax relief for seniors, may -whatever their importance to
the elderly-have problematic social consequences such as
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3607(b)(2)(B)-(C) (2009).
62. Questions and Answers Concerning the Final Rule Implementing the Housing for
Older Persons Act of 1995 (HOPA), http://www.hud.gov/offices/ffieo/1ibrary/hopa95.
pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
63. State of California Office of the Attorney General, Chapter 4-Housing,
http://www.ag.ca.gov/publications/womansrights/ch4.php (last visited Sept. 4,
2009).
64. For example, Sun City defeated seventeen school bond measures in the
years after its establishment in 1962. ANDREw BLECHMAN, LEISUREVILLE:
ADVENTURES IN AMERICA'S RETIREMENT UTOPIAS 133 (New York: Grove/Atlantic,
2008).
65. Andrew Jaynes, Comment, What is Benevolence? Clarifying Wisconsin's Real
Property Tax Exemption for Benevolent Organizations and the Argument for the
"Retirement" of the Exemption for High-End Senior-Housing Complexes, 2006 WIs. L.
REV. 1433, 1437, 1453-54 (2006).
66. About Del Webb, http://www.pulte.com/delwebb/value-of-delwebb/
AboutDelWebb.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2009).
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deleterious impacts on school financing or impacts on the ability
of new residents to move into communities.67
Nor is it clear that it would be desirable to generalize the
senior enclave community as a model for independent living in
the community. Communities such as Sun Cities are often built
on less expensive land, located in exurbs relatively distant from
the amenities of cities. They are constructed for car-dependent
external transportation and may feature golf-cart lanes as a form
of internal transportation. They offer seniors relief from many
aspects of home or yard maintenance, but many offer no or
limited support for transportation of the kind that may be
important if residents are no longer able to drive and are not
near to readily-available public transportation. Amenities-
clubhouse-style restaurants, golf courses, tennis courts, and
extensive fitness facilities-are aimed at retirees who are
physically active. They replicate a suburban country-club-like
life-but of course without the children in the swimming pool. 68
As Sun Cities and other similar communities have been
multiplying across the United States, far less construction has
been devoted towards independent living options that do not
reflect the isolationism of a Sun City. The lack of independent
living options for lower income seniors has been well known.69
For better off seniors, too, housing options that offer increased
services but that are also integrated into the community are
comparatively rare. "Congregate housing," an independent
living option where some shared services such as meals are
available, can be found in some communities but reportedly has
long waiting lists nationwide.70 Choices are more likely to be
67. Robert C. Christopherson, Missing the Forest for the Trees: The Illusory Half-
Policy of Senior Citizen Property Tax Relief, 13 ELDER L.J. 195, 197, 212-13 (2005). For a
general discussion of the inequities of such "localism," see Laurie Reynolds,
Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH.
L. REV. 93, 94 (2003).
68. See, e.g., Sun City Specialist, http://awarebuyers.com/sun-city-anthem/ (last
visited Sept. 11, 2009).
69. See, e.g., Congregate Housing for Seniors, http://www.helpguide.org/elder/
congregate.housing-seniorsresidential.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
70. See id. ("Unfortunately though, there has been a shortage of such housing,
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limited to assisted living facilities that increasingly resemble
nursing homes, or to nursing homes themselves. Ironically, the
paternalistic assumptions about the need for "care" and
concomitant medicalization have long been the bane of people
with disabilities.71
Market activity in this area has surely been affected by
Medicare and Medicaid funding policies, which we will discuss
more fully later. Medicare does not cover long-term care and
has a limited benefit for skilled nursing care required after a
hospitalization. 72 Medicaid covers nursing home care, but in its
standard form does not cover assisted living services or
independent living options.73 Recognizing that these limits were
driving some seniors who could not afford to pay for
independent living options on their own away from these
preferred options into more expensive, and more medicalized,
nursing home options paid for by Medicaid, a number of states
now operate Medicaid waiver programs that offer some
coverage for assisted living.74 There are at present forty-one
different waiver programs operating in twenty-six states-
indicative of states' interest in continuing to explore
independent housing options for the elderly.75 Despite the
number of waiver programs, enrollment in them is limited and
there are large geographical gaps in coverage. 76  Medicaid
and a lack of funding for new projects.")
71. See, e.g., Harriet McBryde Johnson, The Disability Gulag, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2003, 59; see generally The Disability Rights and Independent Living Movement,
http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/collections/drilm/index.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
72. Medicare, Longterm Care, http://www.medicare.gov/longTermCare/static/
home.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
73. Jon Pynoos et al., Aging in Place, Housing, and the Law, 16 ELDER L. J. 77, 85
(2008).
74. See, e.g., Area Agency on Aging of Pasco Pinellas, Inc., Assisted Living
Medicaid Waiver, http://www.agingcarefl.org/services/funding/sources/elderly
Waiver (last visited Nov. 8, 2009) (explaining that the purpose of the waiver is to
avoid nursing home placement).
75. Medicaid Waivers and Demonstration List, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGI/MWDL/list.asp?sortByDID=2&submit-Go&filterTy
pe=dual%2C+keyword&filterValue=assisted+living&filterByDID=0&sortOrder-asce
nding&intNumPerPage=10&listpage=5 (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
76. Jon Pynoos et al., supra note 73, at 85.
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programs in twenty-nine states are also experimenting with
home care as an alternative to nursing home placement;
although the experiments are praised as a way of enabling
people to remain in the community, concerns have been voiced
about displacement of responsibilities onto families.77
To summarize the argument of this section, the FHAct has
importantly affected barriers in the built environment: people
with disabilities have the right to modify existing premises, and
new buildings must meet certain accessibility requirements.
These are significant steps, but they are also limited in crucial
ways. The FHAct specifically exempts the type of senior
housing that has significant political and social effects,
privileging even in tax policy an isolated, "active senior"
lifestyle. At the same time, the FHAct does not cover much of
the housing stock in the United States, single-family homes,
even when they are newly constructed. For many, when the
barriers in private home design become too much-or even
when the isolation or care responsibilities are no longer
optimal-options are limited to assisted living facilities that may
increasingly resemble nursing homes, or to nursing homes
themselves. These choices do not, we fear, represent a full set of
meaningful options for independent living in the community.
On these matters, the concerns of the elderly and people with
disabilities surely coincide, although the FHAct's senior
community exemption may have in part functioned to
misleadingly drive them apart.
SENIOR DISCOUNTS
From movie theaters to museums to the "Golden Age" passport
to the National Park system, discounts for seniors are familiar
and widespread. One legal challenge to age-based discounts for
both seniors and children, brought under California's Unruh
77. John Leland, Helping Aged Leave Nursing Homes for a Home, NEW YORK
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2009, at A10.
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Civil Rights Act, has been rejected.78 In rejecting the challenge,
the California court cited the various benefits to seniors,
children, and the community of such discounts.79 Although this
example may seem of merely symbolic importance in
comparison to housing or health care, it is worthwhile
considering as a simple model for more inclusive policies.
There are surely justifications for age-based discounts to
public services such as museums or parks, but these
justifications are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive if they
are applied to single out the elderly, or even the elderly and
children, as the only groups warranting protection. Need-based
justifications do not track older age particularly well-and some
surely might as easily apply to people with disabilities.
Moreover, at least among the elderly but among the general
population too, there may be better surrogates for need that are
as simple to administer as age per se, such as the museum
discounts based on pension status (rather than age) observed by
one of the authors in Germany. In the United States, simple
proxies for need could include eligibility for Medicaid or for SSI.
The likelihood that seniors have contributed to public services
through payment of tax dollars is a possible justification for the
discounts, but residency requirements would be a far better
measure of such contributions. The usefulness of attracting
attendance by people who are likely not to be working during
"off peak" hours would justify reducing off-peak costs for
everyone rather than limiting the incentive to seniors. One
justification- that discounts encourage seniors to enjoy
community amenities-is a powerful one, but one that
appropriately applies to the community more generally and,
78. Starkman v. Mann Theatres Corp., 278 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545, 549 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991); see Pizarro v. Lamb's Players Theatre, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859, 860, 863 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (involving a challenge to a different age-related theatre discount: a
theatre performing a play about baby boomers offered Wednesday night half-price
tickets to members of the baby boom generation (those born between 1946 and
1964) as well as to children. The theatre's refusal to grant similar discounts to other
adults was challenged under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. The court upheld
the discount as a reasonable classification given the theme of the play).
79. Starkman, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
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notably, is often used as a justification for discounts for school
children, children under a certain age, and families.
Title II of the ADA protects against exclusion from
participation in public services based on disability and ADA
Title III protects against discrimination in public
accommodations. In this context, comparable discount
programs for people with disabilities are less widespread. In the
experience of one of the authors, some purported disability
discount programs are a compromise to compensate for inferior
services offered to people with disabilities: for example,
wheelchair seating with occluded sight lines in theaters and
stadiums, or subway systems in which only a few stations offer
elevator access. Nor would reduced prices appear to be
required when equal access is provided for people with
disabilities; as the Technical Assistance Manual for ADA
compliance indicates, there is no requirement that extra services
be provided people with disabilities.8 1
The National Park Service pass system exemplifies a far
more inclusive model for extending discounts. The current
system, created in 2004, offers a set of options.8' The Senior Pass,
which costs $10 and lasts for life, admits the person over sixty-
two-together with a car and up to three other adults-for free. 82
The Access Pass provides the same access to people with
disabilities and is free, reflecting that despite improvements in
accessibility most parks offer less than full opportunity for
participation to people with various disabilities.8 3 There are also
somewhat inexpensive ($80) annual passes available for people
who anticipate extended park use, parallel to the family
memberships available at many museums or other attractions
80. The Americans with Disabilities Act Title II Technical Assistance Manual,
11-3.3000, http://www.ada.gov/taman2.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
81. National Park Service, America the Beautiful-National Parks and Federal
Recreational Lands Pass, http://www.nps.gov/fees.-passes.htm (last visited Sept. 12,
2009).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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aimed at people with children.84 Some national parks also offer
accessible tram or van service for travel within the park.85 Such
programs provide an illustration of what it might mean to
expand inclusiveness in a way that age-based discounts alone do
not. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that even these quite
expansive discount programs fall short of extending access to
many in meaningful ways. For example, there are no discounts
for the poor comparable to subsidized housing or food stamps,
and access to most national parks is primarily by either private
car or tour bus.
HEALTH CARE
Access to museums, theaters, or parks-while surely important
to quality of life-is not a matter of life or death. Access to
health care may be, and it is here that the contrast between age
and disability is starkest. When Medicare was enacted in 1965,
Medicaid, enacted at the same time, was largely viewed as an
afterthought.86  Since the addition of a pharmacy benefit to
Medicare, long-term care remains the principal health care need
that is not covered by the program. People without sufficient
private resources to cover their long term care needs must rely
on the Medicaid program; and a high percentage of long term
care in the United States is paid for by state Medicaid budgets.87
Eligibility for Medicare is established by having paid into
the Social Security system for forty quarters and attaining age
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Yosemite National Park Accessibility Guide, www.nps.gov/yose/
planyourvisit/upload/access.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2009); Zion National Park
Accessibility, http://www.nps.gov/zion/planyourvisit/accessibility.htm (last visited
Oct. 30, 2009).
86. See, e.g., Christine Cassell, M.D., The Right to Health Care, the Social Contract,
and Health Care Reform in the United States, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53, 57-8 (1994).
87. Estimates are that nearly half of long term care in the U.S. is paid for by
Medicaid. See, e.g., Howard Gleckman, Get Medicaid Out of the Long Term Care
Business, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/
Columns/2009/August/080309Gleckman.aspx; Medicaid: Impact on Longterm Care,
http://www.theceal.org/column.php?ID-25 (Mar. 2009).
160 [Vol. 11
TOO MANY INTERSTICES
sixty-five." Over ninety-five percent of people over age sixty-
five in the United States qualify for Medicare in this way.89
People with long-term disabilities also qualify for Medicare if
they have been entitled to Social Security Disability Income
(SSDI) for twenty-four months.90 People with end stage renal
disease were added to the Medicare program in 1972,91 and some
critics contend that the expense of that program contributed to
deter more sweeping health care reform in the United States. 92
This criticism is but one illustration of how people with
disabilities have been held up as a problem for health care
reform in the United States.
The connection between Medicare and a work history
qualification has reinforced the view of Medicare as an "earned"
benefit. 93 The commitment to Medicare remains clear despite
current budgetary difficulties. 94 As enacted, Medicare required
only that care within its coverage limits be "reasonable and
necessary." 95 Comparative cost-effectiveness is not generally an
element in coverage determinations, 96 although a number of
demonstration projects do incorporate such considerations. 97
The variety of proposals for health care reform now under
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c(1) (2009).
89. The Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that approximately 600,000 of the
elderly in the U.S. did not qualify for Medicare in 2008. Kaiser Family Foundation,
The Uninsured: A Primer 1 (Oct. 2009), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451-
05.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c(2) (2009).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 426(b) (2009).
92. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Where Civic Republicanism and Deliberative
Democracy Meet, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 12.
93. See, e.g., Philip Lee, M.D. et al., Politics, Health Policy, and the American
Character, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 7, 23 (2006).
94. Obama's Health Care Speech to Congress, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/us/politics/l0obama.text.html?_r-1
(full text of speech available online only).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1) (2009).
96. See Medicare Evidence Development and Coverage Advisory Committee,
Process for Evaluation of Effectiveness and Committee Operations (Jan. 12, 2006),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/FACA/Downloads/recommendations.pdf.
97. An early example was a test of influenza vaccines. See Medicare Influenza
Vaccine Demonstration, 41(09) MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REV. 152, 152
(Mar. 6, 1992), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/0001623
2.htm.
20091 161
MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR
consideration include possibilities for introducing such cost
effectiveness assessments into Medicare coverage generally, and
these have been a target of critics of reform.
By contrast, Medicaid has been popularly viewed as a
"welfare" program.98 Limits on Medicaid coverage have been a
chronic problem. When Medicaid recipients with disabilities
challenged a limit on hospital days that affected them
disproportionately, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
challenge.99  The Court's conclusion was based on the
understanding that the limit reflected legitimate state fiscal
concerns rather than discrimination against people with
disabilities. 0 Both before and since the Court's decision, state
Medicaid budgets have been a common target; with current
budgetary deficits, cutbacks in these already strained Medicaid
programs have intensified in some states.10
In another article, we have argued that it is a mistake to
assume that disability-based challenges to Medicaid cutbacks
were forever banished by Alexander v. Choate.102 Instead, we
contended, the plaintiffs in Alexander did not establish that the
cutbacks at issue disproportionately affected people with
disabilities." 3 Cutbacks that do bear disproportionately, we
contended, may be subject to challenge as failing to afford
meaningful access to public services for people with disabilities.
Some legal challenges to the recent cutbacks are now under
way. 04 Nonetheless, the practical realities of contrasts between
the Medicaid and Medicare programs remain severe. Even
when Medicaid coverage obtains, particularly low rates for
provider reimbursement may severely limit patients' options to
98. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor:
Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 572, 606 (1999).
99. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 309 (1985).
100. Id. at 308-09.
101. Id.
102. Francis & Silvers, supra note 22, at 476-77.
103. Id. at 448-49.
104. Victoria Colliver, Judge Blocks State Cuts to Adult Day Care, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Sept. 12, 2009, at A10, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2009/09/12/MNTR19LR7A.DTL.
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obtain care. 05 The unfortunate contrast between apparently
more generous coverage for the elderly and far less generous
coverage for the poor remains.
CONCLUSION
Our goal in this article has been to challenge the supposed
contrasts between discrimination based on disability and
discrimination based on aged-ness. The idea that the "fair
innings" argument divides the aged from the disabled, we have
argued, is mistaken. Ironically, however, examples of apparent
senior privilege-from housing policy to discounts to
Medicare-may seem to fuel the idea that the two groups are
divergent in the degree of justice they deserve. Instead, the goal
should be to consider how designs of public services and public
accommodations can serve the interests of both groups. Many
of the disabled will become aged, and many of the aged are
disabled. To ignore this intersectionality is to divert attention
away from understanding and addressing the (similar) causes
fueling discrimination against both groups and thereby to
diminish protection for each.
105. Cuts to Medi-Cal & Healthy Families Rates Mean More Children Will Go
Without Needed Health Care, http://www.aapca3.org/law/medical.pdf (last visited
Oct. 30, 2009).
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